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Resource allocation at the macro level is a major concern of govern
ment fiscal policy in Japan as in other nations. Three inter-related types
of resource allocation problems may be distinguished. One is to ensure that

labor and capital resources are fully used -- the compensatory finance pro
blem of balancing aggregate demand with futl capacity supply consonant
with price level stability objectives.

While primarily a business cycle

problem it also has implications for growth.
A second problem is to determine and provide for the proper allocation
of resources between the public sector and the private sector. Essentially
it involves the trade-off between the provision of public goods and of
private goods.

-Related to this, third, is the problem of the allocation

of resources between consumption and investment.

This is essentially the

issue of the optimum rate of growth. The government influences not only
private consumption, saving, and investment but of course determines the
rate of public consumption·, saving, and investment. The government has a
variety of instruments to implement its policies -- taxation, expenditures
(on goods and services, and on transfer pay~ents), and borrowing and lending.
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the somewhat more narrow
problem of financing of the government sector in postwar Japan, rather than
directly examining these broad issues.

Nonetheless, the analysis is pre

dicated upon this broader policy framework, and will tackle various facets
of the broader problems, albeit from occasionally indirect approaches. The
main emphasis is on net relationship5-- government investment and its fi.nancing -- with little discussion of government transfer payments or current
purchases of goods and services.
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I first present and discuss the data on public sector investment and its
financing.

Following a brief excursion into intra-governmental financing, I

turn to certain contemporary policy issues emanating from the government's in
Throughout I use the Japanese national in

vestment program and its financing.

come definition of the government sector, which includes central and local
{prefectural and municipal) governments and, at each level, general govern
ment anci government enterprise.

"Government" is thus synonomous with "public

sector, 11 though in terms of policy making it refers mainly to the central level.
Less use is made of the Minis try of Finance legal and budgetary classification
of general account, special accounts, and government corporations, since they
involve considerable overlapping and d~plication on a non-consolidated basis.
The new national incoir.e estimates are used wherever possible.

1

Data are·=in

current prices, unless otherwise noted.
I

As indicated in Table 1, government investment has •grown rapidly in the
postwar period (increasing almost seven-fold between 1952-1964, and 4-1/2 times
in real terms), with some cyclical and erratic fluctuation.

Moreover, the

investment share in the government's total purchase of goods and services has
risen dramatically from the 1952 level of 39 percent to the present level of
approximately 53 per cent. Because GNP and ~grDss domestic investment has also
grown rapidly arid with cyclical swings, the share of government investment in
them has been rather more stable.

Since 1957, however, the trend of the

govemEent investment/GNP ratio has been strikingly upwards, rising from 6.7
percent to 10 per cent. (The 1965 ratio will be considerably higher).
1. As published in Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Monthly,
March 1966.

Table 1. Government Gross Inves tment and Savin g
(curr ent price s, amounts in billio n yen)

(II')

I N V E S T ME N T (I)
Annual
Rate
Incre ase

SAV ING

% Govt.
Purch ase
Goods &
% % Gross
Servi ces Qfil: Inves t.

Annual
• Rate
Incre ase

(S)

Calen dar
Year

Amount

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

398.8
525.2
595.2
747.9
666.7
742.3
891.2
1,080 .2
1,294 .4
1,532 .0
2,085 . l;
2,353 .2
2,692 .5

Sourc e:

New natio nal income stati stics , Bank of Japan , Economic
Stati stics Month ly, March 1966. Savin gs
are adjus ted to inclu de (old) estim ates of centr al gover
nment capit al consu mptio n allow ances
plus local gover nment capit al consu mptio n allow ances estim
ated from Minis try of Home ~ffai rs
works heets ; the 1964 estim ate is prelim inary .

--

31.7
13.3
25.7
-10.9
11.3
20.1
21.2
19.8
18.4
36.1
12.8
14.4

38.8
41.3
41. 7
45.7
42.l
42.6
44.4
47.7
49.4
49.7
53. 7
52.3
52.8

6.6
7.5
7.6
8.8
7.0
6.7
7.9
8.4
8.5

8.3
10.0
10.0
9.7

25.0
32.4
31.6
34.0
.24.7
20.6
27.3
26.6
24.1
21.1
27.4
28.6
26.0

Amount
523.1
479 .1
455.8
464.8
619.9
849.3
708.9
901.0
1>303 .8
1>796 .5
1,977 .8
2,163 .7
2,108 .1

--

- 8.4
4.9
2.0
33.4
37.0
-16.5
27.1
44.7
37.8
10.1
9.4
- 3.6

% Covt.
Revenues
40.l
33.3
29.0
28.2
34.0
39.4
31.3
35.8
41.6
45.8
44.3
41.9
37.1

%

% Gross

Qi! .Savin ~
8.6
6.9
5.8
5.5
6.5
7.7
6.3
7.0
8.6
9.7

9.5
9.2
7.6

32.7
29.5
24.2
21.2
23.0
23.6
21.7
22.2
2l;. 3
24.8
26.0
26.3
20.4

I-S
-124 .3
46.l
139.4
283.1
46.8
-107. 0
182.3
179.2
9.4
-264. 5
107.6
189.5
584.4

-

-4For the post~ar period as a whole private aggregate demand, based on
booming private fixed investment demand, has been sufficiently strong that the
government has not needed to use compensatory fiscal policy to generate demand through deficit spending. Consequently, public sector demand for re
sources has been competitive with private demand.

The exceptions has been the

recession periods of 1954, 1957-5,8, 1962, and 1965, but these represent de
liberate restrictions of aggregate demand to restore balance of payments equili
brium.
The government reaction to the public-private competition in the use of
resources at full capacity levels and rates of growth of output has been, at
least until 1963, to favor the private sector, notably business fixed invest
ment. Government total purchases of goods and services as a proportion of GNP
(17-19 per cent) did not display any rising trend, unlike many other indus
trial nations. The government also encouraged by fiscal and financial means
the relative shift within the private sector from personal consumption to
business investment, in order to promote growth.
While holding the growth of its expenditures to the rate of growth of
~ggregate demand, the government contributed to the growth process not only by
shifting relatively from government consumption to government investment, but
also by allocating its investment mainly to areas complementary to private
production of consumer goods and services -- such as roads, urban water and
sewage systems, and housing ..:,_ the government until recently did t:1.ot increase •
its relative 1.allocation of investment to these areas.

In other words, in

order to support economic growth by means increases in private business invest-

--5--

ment, industrial capacity and output, the government restrained the production
of public consumption goods and of housing relative to demand more than any
restriction of private production of consumer goods and services,
A further implication of strong private aggregate demand was that the
government had to finance its investment by the least ·demand-creatin g method.
Governments can pay for their gross investment (and other expenditures) by
fiscal means through internal financing (gross saving) or by financial means
through external borrowing .~ram households, private financial institutions, the
central bank, or from abroad. Government saving out of tax and non-tax revenues
is the least demand-creating method, followed in order by borrowing from individuals, from financial institutions, and from the central bank. 1

In Japan

the domestic demand effect of government foreign borrowing is the same as
borrowing from the Bank of Japan, since t_he government converts the foreign
exchange received into yen by selling either the foreign exchange or foreign
exchange bills to the central bank.
As is clear from Tables 1 and 2, in Japan the government has relied
.
'
'
.
( I) 2 .
heavily on its own savings
to f inance its
investment

In the early post-

war years government saving was greater than investment; inflation came not
from government expenditures but from the central_ bank-financed lending of
government financial institutions.

Thereafter government investment has grown

1. If we as"sume that any increase in aggregate demand from the financing
of government investment in a ful.l resource employment economy tends to in•
crease private demand relative to public and to increase total consumption
relative to investment, then this same sequence applies to these allocations as
well,

2. Government saving consists of the surplus on current account (tax
and non-tax revenues including government enterprise profits less current ·
purchases of goods and services, subsidies, and transfer payments) and capital
consumption allowances of government enterprise.

6
Table 2
Government Investment-Savings Gap
(current prices, amounts in billion yen)
National Income
Estimate

Flow of Funds
a
Estimate

Discrepancy

I-S

Calendar
Year

I-S

I

I-S

Amount

% of I

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963.
1964

139.4
283.1
46.8
-107 .o
182.3
179.2
9.4
-264.5
107.6
189.5
584.4

23.4
37.9
7.0
-14.4
20.5
16.6

165.5
183.9
s. 7
- 98.5
25.0
78.4
-102.5
-192.5
180.4
288,0
651.2

- 26.l
99.2
55.5
8.5
157.3
100.8
93.1
72.0
- 72.8
- 98.5
- 66.8

- 4.4
13.3
8.3
- 1.1
17. 7
9.3
7.2

Sources:

· a:

-

-

.7

-17.3
5.2
8.1
21.7

-

-

6.7
- 3.5
- 4.2
- 2.5

Table 1 and Bank of Japan flow of funds data, adjusted as
indicate·d in notes to Table 3.

Net financial surplus or deficit

. .

-7more rapidly than government saving, with saving lagging
investment since 1962.
the business cycle.

increasingly behind

Both saving and investment are highly influenced by

Government saving has risen rapidly in boom periods be

cause government reVEnues increased more than expected and therefore than
budgeted current account expenditures.

Thus, as indicated in Table 2, the

I - S gap disappeared in the late stages of earlier booms, and increased in re
cession.

The 1964 experience is significant in that the 1-S gap widened rather

than narrowing.

Cumulatively, government saving financed 92.0 per cent of

government investment between 1952-1964, but declining to 87 .6 per cent for

1962-1964, and less if 1965 were included.
An extremely important reason for this high share of internal financing

despite rapid growth of investment is that the government's tax system is
highly elastic relative to the growth of GNP. 1

This has enabled the govern-

ment to follow simultaneously several politic.ally attractive courses: regular
tax rate reductions, increases in current expenditures, increases in investment,
and little obvious increase in borrowing (until 1965).

The government's pro

pensity to save out its actual current. revenue (G) has been high.

A simple

least-squares regression using the new national income data for 1954-1964 pro
vides the following results:
S = 6.267

+ 0.3974G

l

= .911

(0.0375)

d

= 1.060

In other words, the marginal propensity to save is almost 40 per-cent.
1. It is difficult to obtain precise elasticity estimates, since the govern
ment changes tax rates virtually every year. Ishi estimates a weighted average
elasticity to national income of direct taxes of 1.58 and indirect taxes of .990;
cf. Ishi Hiromi tsu, "Sozei Danryokusei no I chi Keisoku" (A measurement of Tax
Elasticity), Hitotsubashi Ronso, Vol. 52, No. 5 (November 1964). In addition
income has shifted 1elatively relative to corporate business, which has a
higher~tax rate,

-8Thus, between 1954-1964 only 8 per cent of government investment had to
be financed from external sources.

.

In other words, the government relied only

to this extent on the net voluntary transfer of claims on resoo~ces from outside
the public sector. The amount and degree of external financing are measured by
1
the investment-savings gap in the first two columns of Table 2.

Two points

should be made. First, consolidated at all levels the government has been a
net borrower continuously (with cyclical exceptions only) since 1952.

Second,

the amount of government borrowing has been rising sharply since 1962, culminating
in the 1965 decision to sell new issues of government debentures to households
and financial institutions. This more recent trend is clearly related to the
increased share of government investment in GNP.
One procedure to est:i.mate government reliance on external borrowing is to
regress the net issue of government securities (Y) on government investment and
service:

Y= a

0

+ a 1 I+ a 2s.

Two estimates were made.

The first (Y ) had as the dependent variable net
1

long-term bond issue (mainly local governments and government corporations),
while the second (Y ) included in addition sho).'."t-term government bills.
2

The

results were:
yl = -50 .685 + .0932 I + .02943 S

(.0494)

Y = -8,566 +- .6932 I
2
(.1746)

l

= .927

= 2.45

(.0535)

d

- .7038S

2
R_ = .834

(.1894)

d = 2.43

The coefficients in the first equation are not really significant, especially
for S, despite the good fit. The sign for S seems wrong.

This, however, may

be explained by the tendency for local government and government enterprise
1. The flow of funds data, which provide an alternative estimate of the I-S
gap from the net financial deficit of the public sector, underestimate the gap re
lative to the national income data for earlier years, but overestimate for 1961It is unclear as to which is the better estimate; fortunately, the di
'196l1,
vergence appears to be relatively decreasing.
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investment, and bond issue to finance it, to grow most rapidly in a boom, when
I

S a'iso is growing rapidly, and to slow down, together with Sin the recession.
The second equation looks much better.

However, Sand I are highly

correlated and have virtually the same coefficients; this equation

really indi

cates that government security issue increases by • 7 times the increase in the
I - S gap.

But the implied causal relationship is probably spurious.

the change in government security issue is in short-term bills.

Most of

At the height

of the boom the I - S gap narrows (Table 2) because of the officially un
anticipated increase in saving.

Coincidentally the government loses foreig~

exchange reserves due to balance of payments problems; it can therefore reduce
its foreign exchange bill sales to the Bank of Japan.

Thec.pposite happens

both to saving and to foreign exchange reserves in the recession.
The external sources of the·financing of government investment are esti
mated from flow of funds data, and appear in Table 3.

Of the cumulative total

borrowed by the government between 1954-1964, 68.9 per cent came from the pri
vate sector, 44.2 per cent from the Bank of Japan (almost all in 1964), and
-13 .1 per cent from abroad (i.e., the government was a net foreign lender).

Within the private sector the government borrowed on a net basis from house
holds and financial institutions, and while lending to corporate business.
Government borrowing from the Bank of Japan is measured by direct trans.
1
actions.
Hence, government borrowing from the private sector which is in

1. Government foreign exchange holdings and their financing are consoli
dated to the Bank of Japan sector in order to focus on government borrowing
for purposes other than holding foreign exchange.

Table 3

1954
From Private
Sector (A)
77.5
Households
l~.eceipts from
143.9
Loans to
59.7
net
84.2
Corporate nusiness
P..eceints from
2.9
Loans to
102.1
l-Jet
- 99.2
Financial Instit,
·Receipts from
50.9
Loans to
- 41.6
::Jet
92.5
From Bank of
Japan (E)
From Abroad (C)
Total (A+l.J+C)
Source:
1Jote:

•

External Sources of Government Finance, 1954-1964
(billion yen)

I

~

170.7

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

20.5

59.1

23.3

- 37.1

140.7
36.6
104.l

175.2
51.0
124.2

131.2
66.3
114.4

3.9
90.3
-86.4

- 5.1
84.9
-90.0

56.1
53.3
2.8
261.8

- 82.7

-98.4.

165.5

1S3.9

1960 .

1961

1962

1963

1964

- 18.9

25.1

31.0

169.5

256.3

199.9

176.5
89.8
86.7

238.3
34.8
153.5

272.0
90.0
182.0

294.9
103.2
191. 7

391.1
120.2
270.9

396.0
114.2
231.8

467.0
150.9
316.1

2.7
122.3
-119.6

16.9
124.0
-107.1

10..8
147.8
-137.0

33.3
166.4
-133.1

53.1
210.5
-157.4

79.8
267.6
-187.8

74.2
285.0

73.6
406.8

-210.s

-333.2

68.1
43.2
24.9

48.2
19.7
28.5

29.1
45.~
- 16.7

50.2
35.6
- 35.4

94.3
118.1
- 23.8

128.3
131.6
- 3.3

144.0
57.6
86.4

267.S
82.5
185.3

302. 6 ..
85.6
217.0

-74.4

-146.0

77.1

120.6

-117.6

-220.1

- 19.6

20.2

444.3

6,6

24.2

- 15.0

- 23.3

- 10.0

-

30.5

ll.5

7.0

- 8,7

- 98.5

25.0

78.4

-102.5

-192.5

180.4"

288.0

651.2

3.4

Based on Bank of Japan :t"low of funds d4t~ plus data on local frOvernment loans and equity to private
business corporation s.
.
The government sector includes central and loc2l ~overnment, government enterprises , and ~overn
Ment financial inscitution s, but excludes ~overnnent holdings of forei~n exchan~e and coin
production (both of which are consolidc!-te d into the Bank of Japan sector).

'"
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effect financed by the central bank credit to the private sector is excluded.
(It would be fruitless to include it, since in that case all government domes
tic borrowing could be regarded as central bank financed).

Government direct

reliance on central bank credit has been short-term, relatively small, and
seasonal or cyclical in nature.

The· government is legally restricted ·in its

borrowing from the Bank of Japan to short-term bills.

Much has been to finance

increases in government purchases of domestically produced rice; this seasonal
phenomenon results in increased net borrowing on a calendar year basis in years
of good rice crops.

The government was able to pile up sufficient liquidity

during 1960-1962 from the small I-S gaps and increasing net borrowings from
the private sector that it coul_d finanC:e its own activities and pay off bills
held by the BAnk of Japan as they matured.

In 1964 it financed the sharply

widening l-S gap by increased bill sales to the Bank of Japan.
I was surprised to find that the go·vernment has been a net foreign lender
rather than borrower. Evidence suggests that

the government's net foreign

debt has declined fromabout ¥184 billion ($501 million) at the end of 1953
to ¥34 billion ($95 million) at the end of 1964.

1

On a gross basis the centra~

government, a few local governments (Tokyo, Osaka), and government agencies
(Japan Development Bank, Nippon Telephone

&

Telegraph Public Corporation) have

borrowed abroad long-term by such means as loans· from the World Bank, the U.S.
Export-Import Bank, and bond issues, At the same time the central government
and its agencies have lent long-term even mor_e abroad, mainly loans by the
1. The foreign borrowing estimates are the least reliable, though I
regard them as reasonably accurate. The Bank of Japan has not made available
sectoral foreign asset and liability stock figures since 1959, though some
flow data are available, These estimates are derived from adjustments of
_stocks by flow data. Since the basis of estimation has changed slightly, since
gold and foreign exchange are facluded in foreign borrowings data (though not
here), and since the Bank of Japan data are deliberately vague on these
. matters, some errors may have resulted.

-12Export-Impo rt Bank of Japan (which increased by ¥416 billion -- $1,556 million
between the ends of 1953 and 1964) and subscriptio ns to such internation al or
ganizations as the IMF, World Bank, and IDA.
The net· flows between government and the private sector summarize and
mask somewhat the much larger gross flows, which are extensive and compli~
cated.

The government, in addition to its current spending, investing and

saving activities, is a large financial intermediar y, operating through
variety of government financial institution s.

a

In some items it may be possi

ble to trace government borrowing directly to those units engaging ir. govern
ment investment; examples are debentures solq by central government public
corporation s to individuais and business corporation s using their services
and to. financj_al institution s, and local government bond sales to and loans
from financial institution s.

Host, however, become mingled with other funds

and passed through several intermediar ies before investment expenditure s
actually occur.
The most notable example is individual postal savings and post-office
annuities and life insurance.

These net flows are the largest single and ·

also most routine source of government borrowing.

The administrat ive procedure

is to mingle the postal savings with other funds administere d by the Trust
Fund Bureau.

These funds, along with postal annuity and life insurance funds

and others, are then used to finance the government' s Investment and L~an Pro
gram.

The Program ~ODSists of transfers to local governments and eentral

government enterprise activities by means of loans and bond purchase, and
loans to the private s~ctor through government financial institution s and bond
purchase.

-13·However, there is a surprisingly close correlation between the net flow
of postal savings, annuities and life insurance (P) and net government loans (L)
to corporate (and to a lesser extent unincorporated) enterprise.
Using 1954-1964 flow of funds data,

L = -64.3 + 1.19 P
(O .0155)

2
R =

d

.9106

= 1.524

This implies that government lending activity depends mainly upon the'inflow
of postal savings and life insurance.

It suggests that Minis try of Finance

decision-makers employ, perhaps not explicitly, some such rule of thumb
criterion in preparing the Investment and Loan Program.

If so, then government

financial interm~diation is separated from the operation of fiscal policy.
We might also note that since government financial institutions lend primarily
to big business, in this way saving of small savers is channelled on a pre
ferential basis to large-scale enterprises ..
Even on a net basis among the household, corporate business, and financial
institution subsectors of the private sector, the government cumulatively
between 195!•-1964 received 163.2 per cent of its total net borrowings (in
cluding the Bank of Japan) from households, made loans equivalent to 142.0
per cent of its borrowings to the corporate sector, and received 47.7 per
cent of its borrowings from financial institutions.

In other words, the

government borrowed considerably more for purposes of relending than for financing its own investment.

-

On a gross basis the central government sold

virtually none of its bills or bonds to the private sector; it was legally
restricted in its bond issue, and kept its bill rate uncompetitively low since
it could rely upon their purchase by the Bank of Japan.

The most important

·-14flows between private and

governmen t sectors have been postal savings and

life insurance , public corporati on and local governmen t bond issues, govern
ment loans to business, and purchase of bank bonds.
Analysis of the ~ffects of governmen t financial intermed iation on the amount
of private saving and on the cornpos-iti on of the total allocatio n of investmen t
funds is beyond the scope of this paper.

We may note.,that the net increase

be.tween, 1954-1964 in governlJlen t loans to corporate. _ enterpris e and household s
was only 11.7 per cent of the loan increase by private financial institutio ns.
Government loans have been concentra ted, however, to relativel y few industrie s;
for example, the electric power industry received 35 per cent of its loans
from the Japan Developm ent Bank, and the shipping industry (perhaps the only
unprofita ble industry in postwar Japan) some 57 per cent.
II

Thus far I have treated the governmen t as a single homogeneo us unit.

In

terms of the locus of decision-m aking on tax, expenditu re, and financial
policies this is reasonabl e, since the central governmen t strongly influence s
if not actually determini ng local governmen t policies as well as
central

governmen t enterpris es.

those of

Huch of the power on these matters is con

centrated in the Hinistry of Finance.

An important reason for such concentra tion of power at the central level
is the imbalance between expenditu res and internal sources of financing of

local governmen ts and governmen t enterpris es. While in aggregate the public
sector may finance most of its investmen t from its own saving, when dis
aggregate d by levels of governmen t or by type of activity (general governmen t
versus governmen t enterpris e), the. central governmen t has a large surplus of

-15revenues over expenditures, local governments have excess expenditures, while
government enterprise investment grows more rapidly than their internal
generation of funds.
The drastic central-local government revenue-expenditure imbalance is
1
clear from the data in Table 4.
More detailed data on the level of govern
ment investment and their sources of financing are provided in Table 5. 2 The
central government engages in 40-45 per cent of total public sector invest
ment, but finances 55-60 per cent of it. 3

These are net flows; gross flows

are even larger since local governments finance portions of certain central
government investment projects.

More important, central government financing

is under-estimated since certain tax receipts which actually were collected
at the central level are attributed to local governments.
1. The national income statistics are inadequate for this breakdown
because they attribute to the central government much investment actually
done at local levels. I calculate central government investment in the old
national income statistics to be overestimated by approximately 45-50 per
cent, with a corresponding underestimate of local government investment. The
underestimate in the new national income statistics (for 1955-62) is about
35 per cent.

2. Percentages for investment by central government differ slightly
from Table 4 because inventory investment is excluded and there are slight
differences in coverage.
3. This tends to understate the flows, since central government enter
prise investment is large and is financed at the central level. For general
(non-enterprise) government investment, the central government does about
23 per cent and finances about 46 per cent.

(.

Table 4
Share of Central in Total Government
Revenues and Expenditures
(in per cent of total)
Fiscal
Year

Revenues

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
Cumulative
Average
Note:

Expenditures

Purchase of All
Goods & Services

Investment

73.6
71.8
70.8
70.2
71.9

41.5
42.0
41.4
51.9

71.9

71.8
71.6

50.0
48.7
50.6
50.3
50.6
49.7
47.8

43.0
42.1
42.6
42.0
39.5

39.7
34.8
31,3
49.3
41.0
40.2
40.7
43.2
41.9
42.3
40.8
41.2

n.o

48.6

41.0

41.l

71. 7
72.0
72.6
73.0

49o2

35.5
36.5
36.2
44.9
41. 7
41.8
41.2

Including government enterprise saving and investment.

Source: Worksheets from forthcor.:iing study on the public sector in postwar
Japan. Expenditures (notably the investment component) are adjusted to the
level of government where they actually occurred.

\
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Table 5

Gross Fixed Investment Expenditures arid its Financing
by Level of Government
(per cent of total)

Fiscal
Year

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

Share

Central

Prefecture

Investment by

39.9

30.6

29.5

Financed by

56.5

19.8

23.7

Investment by

42.3

27.1

Financed by

58.'7

30.6
20.0

Investment by

42.3

31.1

26.6

Financed:. by

58 .O.·

21.9

20.9

Investment by

46.2

29.8

24.0

Financed by

59.8

21.0

19.2

Investment by

41.4

33.6

25.0

Financed by

55.4

24.3

20.3

Investment by

44.0
57.1

31.2
22.7

24.8

Financed by

Municipality

21.3

20.2

Note: Includes government enterprise, which is financed primarily at same
level of government.· Central government financing is probably under
estimated.
Source: Computed from Jichisho (Ministry of Local Autonomy}, plus
adjustments for excluded central government ent. I.

-18As is implici;t:..,ig Table 4 local governments finance only approximately
half of their consolidated expenditures from within.
funds is great.

Their need for external

Most come from the central government, through a complex

variety of channels.

In brief, they are:

1

automatic allotment of specified

percentages of certain taxes collected at the central level;

2

central govern-

ment grants for specified local expenditures, such as compulsory education,
health facilities, and disaster relief; central government loans and purchases
of local government bond issues (mainly from Trust Fund Bureau and postal
annuity and life insurance funds), usually related to specific investment
projects; and bond sales to and loans from the private sector and from abroad.
Only a few large municipalities and prefectures have sufficiently high credit
ratings to be able to issue bonds publicly.
The separation of functioµs -- with the central government collecting
most of the taxes and the local government doing most of the purchases of
goods and services (inc_luding investment)
of efficien~y.

poses some interesting issues

I am not aware of studies of the relative efficiency (cost,

degree of evasion, etc,) of collection of different kinds of taxes at various
levels of government, nor of the -relative efficien~y of different types of
expenditures.

3

I hypothesize that the central government is more efficient

in collection of most kinds of taxes, due to economies of scale and the ad
vantages of having identical rates throughout the country. For expend~tures
1.
(1965)

Ministry•of'Hom e Affairs, The Local Finance System in Japan. n.d ••

2. 28.9 percent of personal income, corporation and liquor taxes.
Allotment, while automatic to local government's as a group, is dis
cretionary for individual local ·units, depending on their financial needs
·and local tax base.
3.
points.

I hope that participants in this c9nference can inform me on these
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the picture is much less clear, depending greatly on the type of expenditure.
i
There is perhaps a presumption of greater efficiency at the central level

since it is able to attract better human resources.
Efficiency is not the sole, nor necessarily the most important
for evaluating central-local relationships.

criterion

Clearly policital and social

objectives loom heavily (for example, the desired degree of decentralized
governmental decision-making , or of voter identification with and participation
in local politics).

Whatever may have been early postwar reform objectives,

the degree of actual fiscal dependence of local government on central severely
circumscribes the independent power and decision-making ability at the local
level.
III

The events of·the past few years -- the relative rise in government invest
ment, the greater relative decline in private demand (as business fixed in
vestment demand first levelled off, and then declined somewhat, as a per
cent of GNP), the increased reliance by government on borrowing to pumpprime and to finance government investment, and the lowering of interest
rates -- attest to the changes evolving in public-private sector relation
ships. While some of these represent new trends and new problems, some pro
bably are of a temporary nature only, and certain old problems are likely
to come once agaip to the fore. In this section I consider three policy
issues: the major questions of the financing of future government investment and of interest rate policy, and the lesser issue of whether the public
or private sector is entitled to the initial claim on resources generated
from expansion of central bank credit.
5-8 ·years.

My time horizon ·is on the> order of
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A basic assumption is that the share of government investment in GNP (and
in_ gross domes tic investment) will continue to rise somewhat. The lag in
government social overhead investment has produced a strong pent-up demand
for public provision of certain consumer services which is being reflected
through the political process. 1

These pressures are likely to remain extremely

strong for at least another five years. They will induce a considerable shift
in the allocation of investment from private production of goods and services
to public production.

Let us examine the nature of these pressures briefly.

Demand focuses mainly on urban housing and roads, and to some extent on
urban environmental sanitation (water and sewage systems)

The housing shortage

variously estimated as involving 17-33 per cent of the population -- is a legacy
of World War II destruction and low priority to housing in the 1950 's.

While

about 90 per cent of housing investment is in the private sector, approximate
ly one-third of that is government-fina nced.

The need is particularly great

for relatively low-priced urban dwelling units, an area in which government in
vestment has concentrated.

High urban land prices, high interest rates, need

for large-scale investment, and lack of private financial institution support 2
on the one.hand, and on the other hand government experience in such large
scale projects, ability to subsidize through low interest rates and other
measures, ability to obtain land through condemnation processes, and a feeling
by citizen and bureaucrat-tha t housing is a gov~rnmental responsibility -1. Indeed, the government pl~ns (income doubling between 1961-1970, and
medium-term for 1964-1968) and, more important, budgets have already been
responsive to these problem& and no doubt will continue to respond.
2. This could change fairly rapidly if alternative lending opportunities
dry up and interest rates continue to decline.

-21all argue for a considerably greater government housing investment as well as
finanding program.

1

The demand for investment in roads is also very strong, and will rise
rapidly.

It is not limited to consumers.

As industries find urban land and

other production costs rising, they increasingly diversify geographically.

Truck

transport, over even terrible roads, has accordingly grown rapidly and will
continue.

Most important, perhaps, is the growth of the automobile industry

and reliance upon it as one of the major leading sectors for future growth of
the economy. Without a substantially better road system than Japan has today,
the cars to be produced will have no way of being used.
While such government social overh,'!ad investment will expand rapidly, govern
ment investment to complement private production more directly will not slow
down substantially. Further improvements in the national railroads and es
pecially in harbor faculties are needed. Regional dispersion of industry will
-generate new demands for government complementary investment.
The evaluation of the policy issues depends on whether it is assumed
that demand in the economy is deficient relative to supply capacities, as has
been true for the past 1-1/2 years, or whether aggregate demand is equal to
or tendsto exceed supply.

In a demand deficient situation a large expansion

of government spending financed by borrowing is not competitive with private
sector demand for resources, so a vigorous government investment program has
little social cost.
Evaluation of future policy issues has to be in light of the present
(1965-1966)recession. Its immediate cause was sbuilar to previous recessions:
restrictive monetary policies were undertaken to restrict investment (and hence
1. Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan, 1964-1965,
pp. 99-105.

-22aggregate) demand in order to restore balance of payments equilibrium.

However,

the reaction of the economy to the easing of monetary tightness, once the
balance of payments crisis was over, has been substantially different from
earlier recessions. Easy money since early 1965 has not set off a business
fixed investment boom; the overhang of excess capacity and reduced profit mar
gins has been too great. The government rather quickly recognized the unre
sponsiveness of private investment demand, and also acted rather quickly, in
July 1965.

However, it underestimated the amount of additional spending that

was needed to attain reasonably full capacity operation.

Hence, its increase

in demand during 1965 only balanced decreses in private demand; most of the net
growth in demcmd came from abroad.

Preliminary evidence for the spring of 1966

indicates growing success in government ccmpensatory fiscal measures, but
output is still considerably below the full capacity level.

GNP can grow

rapidly without substantial new private investment until the capacity limits
are reached.
Eventually, however, the very success of compensatory fiscal policy in
generating aggregate demand to a full capacity level of output will once again
place the Japanese economy in its postwar pattern of full demand, with the
attendent financial problems of the past.

At that point, any further relative

increases in government investment (or consumption or transfer payments) will
have to be at the expense of private demand.
The Financing of Government Investment
The rising share of government investment in GNP will probably be financed
increasingly from external sources, both before and once a full aggregate de
mand economy is reached. This judgment is based on the following reasoning.

The government has the objective, though not always achieved, to limit tax
revenues to 20 per cent of national income. Strong political pressures to con
tinue the annual practice of reducing tax rates will·make it difficult to
raise the tax share substantially above 20 per cent. Government current expenditures are unlikely to fall much relative to GNP.

1

In fact, rising private

wage rates and increases in the consumer price ·index will place pressure on
the government to continue to rftise government salaries, so that the government's
wage bill will probably increase more rapidly than GNP.

With constant revenues

and current expenditures and rising investment relative to GNP, the I-S gap
will widen, as indeed it already has in 1964-1965; accordingly ·government will
rely more on borrowed funds. The government will increasingly substitute fi
nancial for fiscal means of obtaining the saving of the economy.
The government could try to increase its net foreign borrowing. Aside from
the fact that at present foreign interest rates are relatively high and funds
less readily available, it is false economy for a government to borrow abroad
simply because the interest rate is lower than do~estic market rates.

2

The

sole justification for foreign borrowing is to increase the supply of re
sources available to the economy as reflected in the balance of payments -- to

1. An only moderate expansion of Japan's defense capabilities, due to
changing governmental policies as Japan's potential international power is
perceived and acted upon, would increase government current expenditures
.substantially.

2. Foreign borrowing involves a real cost ·in that the interest has to
be paid in exports, while domestic borrowing involves only a transfer among
individuals.

-24pay for additional imports, to build up foreign exchange reserves, or to en
gage in foreign investment. This justification of course has been and will
continue to be important for Japan. 1
The government will rely mainly upon domestic borrowing to finance the
rising I-S gap. Ceteris paribus, government borrowing directly from the central
bank rather than from the private sector results in a greater increase in ag
gregate demand because there is no direct decline in private liquidity and
spending.

However, it is analytically useful to examine fiscal and monetary

policies on a consolidated basis in terms of their overall effects.

If the cen-

·tral bank has certain liquidity and expenditure .targets for the private sector
which it can achieve on its own after taking fiscal actions into account, then
there is no difference between government borrowing from the private sector
or from the Bank of Japan. For example, if the government borrows from the
private sector, the Bank of Jap;m can replenish the liquidity drain by loans
to or security purchases fr~m private financial institutions. 2

On

the other

hand, if the gov~rnment were to borrow directly from the Bank of Japan and there
by to generate excess (inflationary) aggregate demand, the Bank of Japan could. re
duce private sector liquidity be reducing its loans to the private sector.
1. For the periods (most of the postwar) in which aggregate demand has been
strong and the balance of payments a substantial constraint upon even more rapid
growth, government foreign lending under the export financing program of the Ex
port-Import Bank of Japan has been rather expensive. It has deprived the economy
of resources for domestic use or foreign exchange from direct cash sales, and
has not yet been a net earner of foreign exchange (new loans each year being,
greater than repayment~) .. Supporters of tnis policy have not demonstrated that,.
it sufficjently developed new markets not otherwise obtainable or generated new
technologies and economies of scale in domestic production to have been worth
while. In recession periods, such as the past 1-1/2 years, the expansion of export
related loans is socially not very costly; indeed it is one good way to generate
additional demand.
-2. This is the present system. The Bank of Japan lends mainly to the pri
vate sector, and most of the government's borrowing is from the private sector.
Apparently, the Bank of Japan has in effect underwritten the recent government
bond issues by informally guaranteeing private financial institutions all the
liquidity they need, through loans or security purchase.

-25In practice policies are unlikely to be implemented this way. Government
direct borrowing from the Bank of Japan is probably relatively more expansive,
especially in periods when the Bank of Japan would prefer not to have
eased.

liquidity

The basic reason is that Bank of Japan independence from government

policy is limited.

Past experience with direct borrowing from the Bank of Japan

by the government and government agencies indicate how powerless the Bank of
Japan may be in such direct relationships. The law prohibiting direct Bank of
Japan purchase of government long-term securities seems well justified.
Whatever restrictive power the Bank of Japan has is more effective against
private financial institutions. Given its large portfolio of short-term loans
to banks, the ·Bank of Japan operates from a position of considerable strength.

It can take the initiative in deciding to restrict credit,

Ironically it is

more effective for the Bank of Japan to hold loans than government securities.
The imperfections of Japan's capital market, and the polHical and administra
tive pressures of the government, restrict the Bank of Japan's freedom to en
gage in open market bond sales for restrictive purposes.
So long as demand is deficient it does not really matter whether the govern.ment borrows from the private sector or from the Bank of Japan.

In either case

Bank of Japan policy supports high liquidity in the private sector.

The pro

blem arises once sufficient demand has been generated through fiscal policy,
and yet the government needs additional financing to cover a portion of the
I-S gap. 1 At that point government investment becomes competitive-wit h pri-

•

vate spending, To prevent inflation, any borrowing to finance government in
vestment must be offset by reductions in private liquidity to contract private
spending by an amount equal to the government investment. As argued above,
1. This presupposes that government investment demand will not be fully
satisfied by the amount of expenditure provided for by compensatory finance.
There is no particular reason to believe that the I-S gap will always be just
filled by the amount of deficit financing (borrowing) needed to obtain full em
ployment of resources.This might be the case for a short period, but not once pri
vate demand again grows fafrly rapidly.

-26government borrowing from the private sector, without support by the Bank of
Japan, most nearly achieves this. This is the most efficient way -- aside from
taxation -- to finance the desired shift of resources to the government from the
private sector without generating inflation.

However, since lending within

the private sector is mainly to finance investment, government borrowing only
·transfers saving, while government internal financing from taxation of private
consumption( through personal iii.come or indirect taxes) increases the economy 1 s
.
1
aggregate saving
rate.
Initial Claim on Bank of Japan Credit
The question of whether the government should borrow from the private sector or from the Bank of Japan raises .a long-run (non-Keynesian) issue as to
whether the government or the private sector is entitled to the initial claim2
.
on resources equa1 to t h e.; a~Qunt
.
1 o f J apan ere d'it. 3
o f expans;i.on
o f Bant

The

Bank of Japan cumulative credit increase between 1954-1964 was 7.2 per cent of
the increase in GNP, a note inconsequentia l claim on resources.
Of this, the government received 36 per cent, but almost all in 1964.

Cen

tral bank credit has gone mainly to private financial institutions. By redis
counting rather than lending to the government, the Bank of Japan has delegated
1. This does not apply to taxes on corporate_prof its, since the corporate
sector has a much higher marginal propensity to save than the government, while
the household propensity is somewhat lower.
2. There is, in add"ition, a secondary claim on resources which occurs
when private financial institutions increase loans and deposits by the multiple
of the initial expansion of 11 high-.powered 11 money. This I assume is done by the •
private financial system.
3. This issue has becu raised in certain underdeveloped countries such as
India, where it is argued that the claim on resources represented by an increase
in currency in circulation (which is one form of financial asset in which the
priva·te sector puts its saving) should go to the government as non-inflationar y
borrowing from the central bank.

I

-27·the resource allocation function to the commercial banks rather than to the
i

government.

This, however, has been mitigated by the private sector lending to

the government.

Indeed, it is misleading to say that the Bank of Japan has not

allocated its credit to the government; it has, but by the indirect process of
loans to the private sector and of private sector loans to the government.

If

these transaction s had been carried out in competitive market place one could
argue that the linkage was rather weak, since the private sector was free to

choose between private and public debt. But in fact the new issues of local
governm~nt and public corporation bonds -- the major form of government borrow
ing through the marketplace -- have been forced ~pon private financial institu
tions at uncompetiti ve terms byy government administrat ive suasion. An implicit
. arrangement seems to have been that any funds financial institution s used for
such purposes would be more or less replenished , if indirectly, by Bank of Japan
loans.
This suggests that the •issue as to whether government or private sector re
ceives the initial claim on resour~es by Bank of Japan credit expansion can be
misleading and is perhaps inconseque ntial.

It is misleading if measurement is

on the basis solely of the direct flow of credit.

It is inconsequen tial if the

decision on the public-priv ate decision on the allocation of resources has al
ready been made and implemented by other fiscal and financial measures.

However,

fiscal..:mone tary policy decision-ma king is not so well articulated and coordinated
in Japan that ·Bank of .Tapan allocations have no effect.
Interest Rate Policy
The prospect of future government investment being financed increasingl y
by borrowing has major implication s for policies concerning the level and
term structure of interest rates. The current levels of •short-term and long~term

-28interes ts rates are atypica l of the postwar period in that many rates on loans
and bonds are close to or at equilibr ium levels.
Almost all interes t rates have been kept abnorma lly low througho ut the
postwar period by a combina tion of legal and adminis trative restrain ts by the
Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. 1

Officia l short-te rm rates have

fluctuat ed slightly over the course of the cycle, but yields on all new bond
issues have remained virtuall y unchange d at artifici ally low levels for a de
cade regardle ss of changes in demand and supply. Evidence on the degree of
tightnes s of funds and on market levels of interes t rates is provided by the
actual call market rates and theeffec tive yields on transact ions in bonds sold
by the Japan·Te lephone

&

Telegrap h Company {den-den sai) to new users of tele

phone service s. The call rate has been subject to wide fluctuat ion {4.75 21. 90 per cent for uncondi tional loam;); the data on average call rates are
poor, especia lly for the period June 1957 - 1962 the Bank of Japan applied
officia l ceiling rates which were not fully observed . 2

For only brief periods

of very easy money has the call rate been below officia l long-ter m interes t
rates.

{Even bank average effectiv e short-te rm lending rates have tended to

be above the long-ter m bond rates).

The den-den yields ranged between 7.5 -

15.0 per cent for the period 1958-19 65.

While the market is narrow, the den-den

rates probably reflect rather well the level of long-ter m rates an~ their
changes .
1. For greater detail, see Hugh T. Patrick , l'Intere st Rates and the Grey
Financi al Market in Japan 11 , Pacific Affairs, Winter 1965-66 .

2.The call rate does not correla te well with the Bank of Japan discoun t

rate; see Hannan Ezekiel , "The Call Money Market in Japan", IHF Staff Papers,

Vol. 13, No. 1 {March 1966). However, Ezekiel uses officia l statisti cs rather
than actual call rates. Regress ions which I estimate d relating the call rate
to growth of GNP (quarte rly change over same quarter of the previous year) also
showed little correla tion; while estimate s of actual call ,rates were used,
they were probably oot very accurate .

-29Only when easy money policies have been pursued (notably in recessio ns)
have short-te rm rates gone substan tially below official ly-deter mined long-ter m
rates.

The disastro us easy money policy of 1963 to reduce short-te rm interes t

rates sufficie ntly below long-ter m rates to establis h a market .equilib rium
term structur e should serve as warning to those who anticipa te that a market
determin ed level and structur e of rates is always consiste nt with a low interes t
rate policy.

The money supply increase d 17 per cent (season ally adjusted 1 ) in

the first half of 1963 and 27 per cent for the year.

This creation of money

did bring the call rate down from a 1962 tight money peak of about 14 per cent
to a 1963 low of 7.3 per cent and the den-den rate from 14.016 per cent to 8.440
per cent (still well above offical rates.).

It also generate d high corpora te

liquidit y, a new round of expendi tures, and an abortive boom leading to renewed
balance of payments problem s.

Of course call and den-den rates once again rose

as the boom develope d.
The present situatio n is differen t from 1963 in that private demand for
funds and for investm ent is relative ly slack while monetary policy is and can
be easy, so that equilibr ium as well as officia, l interes t rates have declined
to postwar lows, so that a market level and structur e of rates is being approxi


mated. This offers the policy-m akers a real opportu nity to establis h viable
and strong capital and money markets by ending the restrict ions on interes t
rates and market transact ions. 2
1. Adjusted also for the surfacin g of hidden loans (fukimi kashida shi)
and hidden deposit s.
2. The argumen ts concern ing the resource allocati on and welfare bene
fits of reliance on markets and prices (interes t rates) for fund allocati on in
place of control s· are well-kno wn and are not repeated here.
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The sale to the private sector of central government bonds in early 1966
I

1
for the first time since 1947, and at a yield (6.795. per cent) attractive in

relatively liquid financial markets, provides a good vehicle for establishing
real issue and secondary markets in debentures. Apparently individual pur
chasers have been guaranteed a high degree of liquidity for

their bonds. This

implies either an active market for government bonds or some form of under
writing ultimately, I suspect, by the Bank of Japan. The decision to sell
government bonds had to overcome a large psychological block in Japan, since
it ended the fiction that the government maintains a balanced budget and does
1
Some fear lingers that governme_nt
not borrow on more than a seasonal basis .
bond issue must lead to inflation -- a sirnpU.stic and misleading view.

2

If government bonds lead the way to a relatively free market in all kinds
of financial assets, considerable adjustments among rates will take place both
in the short-run and long-run,

__ In the short-run, the most important adjust

ment could be between government bonds and financial institution savings and
time deposit r8tes.

If bonds are highly liquid arid maintain their present

As we have seen (Table 3) this is a fiction because the govern
ment has been a net borrower almost every year. However, the borrowing was
in a sense disguised (postal saving, local governments, public corporations);
it was, and is, possible to maintain a surplus in the general account with
-- overall central government deficits, since it covers only a part of central
government expenditures.
1.

2. However, it may not be unreasonable to think that once the gove·rnment
begins government bond-financed deficit spending it will not stop even when
aggregate demand is sufficient. On the other hand, restriction of governmen~
bond issue does not guarantee that fiscal policy will result in price stability.
For example, if private demand were relatively strong, the government could
readily generate inflationary pressures (as perhaps in 1963 and 1964) without
government bond issues by financing a widening I-S gap through increased local
government and public corporation bond issue, and use of government financial'
institutions to finance government rather than private investrr~nt.

-31yield considerably abo\re deposit rates, individuals will be induced to switch
'
1
from deposits to bonds.
Substantial switching would put competitive pressure
on banks to raise deposit rates. This would be healthy; depositers now subsi
dize big business borrowers. An increase in bank deposit rates in turn would
generate pressure to raise postal savings deposits rates. 2
The longer-run effects of a market-determined level and structure of in
terest · rates have far greater implications.

It is useful to distinguish

between two phases: the present with inadequate aggregate demand, and that
period in the future when successful fiscal policy restores the economy to
the high aggregate demand condition prevalent throughout the postwar period. 3
As deficit,_spending progresses, the economy will move continuously from the
first into the second phase.
The first phase, until its later stages, will not pose serious interest
rate problems.

Rates will rise only slightly above present levels, since

1. Much of course depends on expectations concerning bond prices. I
would not be surprised to see develop a de facto floor price, as apparently
exists at present, being supported directly by the monetary authorities
or indirectly by forcing financial institutions to support the market by
purchases.
2. The government can justify postal savings rates somewhat below govern
ment bend yields on grounds on convenience and divisibility.
3. While pump-priraing may be needed for a year or two because of a
show-down in business ir>.vestment, I anticipate a new round of expanded business
investr!lent thereafter, in substantial part due to the very success of fiscal
policy. Of course the increase in private demand does not have to come from
business investment; the only necessary condition is that it come from some
where in the private sector. I ~ssume that, while bothered by -continued ris~s
in consumer prices, the government will still place sufficient emphasis on full
use of resources and growth to take the fiscal actions necessary to generate a
fairly high level of demand (though perhaps below that of the 1961-1964 level).
Finance Minister FaKuda feels a 7-8 per cent growth rate is feasible, and that
deficit financing will have to continue vigorously for three years before
slacking off. See 11 Sato Government's Fiscal Policy--FdKuda-Higo Forum on
Fiscal Problems," Oriental Economist, April 1966.

-32the Bank of Japan will continue to support compensatory fiscal_ policy with easy
money policy.

However, as the rise in demand moyes the economy unto the

second phase, financial markets will begin to tighten and market-determined in
terest rates will begin to rise. 1
In the second phase -- when the Japanese economy is once again in a boom,
with demand pressing against supply capacities -- government spending (in
vestment) will once again be competitive with private spending. Fiscal-monetary
policy will have to end its ease to forestall the emergence of inflationary
and balance of payment problems.

With financial markets accordingly tight, in

terest rates will rise substantially.

Because few financial markets have been

free, past experience provides little information as to how high market-de\

termined short-term and long-term interest rates would rise. The call and
den-den rates are indicators, but their markets are narrow, so that they probably
exaggerate the magnitude of changes. Call rate data are poor arid do not corre
late well with other variables~
Den-den rates (D)", lagged six months, regressed on the rate of growth of

GNP over the same quarter for the previous year provide the following results.
D = 7.77 + 0.1727 GNP_ R2 = .296
2
(0.05q4)
d = 1.6625
1. This tightening may come sooner than anticipated. Apparently there
was some difficulty in selling the individuals' allotment for April 1966;
securities fir~s are repurchasing individuals' bonds at a slight discount be
. low issue price, with the effective yield increasing to 6.87 per cent.

2.

Fitted only to the upswing phase the results are:
D =

7.37 + 0.1616 GNP_
(0 .0391)

2

2
R =

d

.517

= 0.6932

While providing greater explanation, the 1\)urban-Hatson statistic indicates
an autocorrelation problem.

In other words a 10 percentage point increase in the quarterly growth rate
would increase the den-den rate by 1.73 percentage points. Quarterly growth
rates vary much more widely than annual rates, ranging between -7.3 and 26.1
per cent. Whatever evidence we have does suggest a considerabl e rise in martcet
equilibrium interest rates in a boom from present levels.
The important question is how will the government respond to an increase
in the general level of interest rates, and in particular to the price de
cline of outstanding government bonds and the higher requisite yield for new
government bond issues. Will the government allow the market forces to work
themselves out in higher interest rates?

Or- will the government restore con

trols over interest rates (especially long-term rates), set rates low relative
to their equilibrium level, try to halt trading in bonds, and once again
emasculate the nascent capital -market?

What alternative paths are open to

the government?
One alternative wo~ld be to have the Bank of Japan support the bond
market by direct or indirect purchases (loans to financial institution s on
condition they support the bond market).
and eventually self-defeat ing.

This would clearly be inflationar y,

I regard it unlikely as a major action,

though interim support may occur.
A second would be for the government to have a more restrictive fiscal
policy by increasing the share of taxes in GNP or, more politically likely,
by reducing government expenditure s, notably investment. This would both

apply the necessary restriction to demand and reduce the government' s need
to borrow.

But much depends on the size of the I-S gap and the government

decision as to whether its investment program should be carried through.

-34It is very likely that a full demand condition will be restored before the
government has built sufficient houses, roads, waterworks, harbors, etc. The
government may be unwilling to restrict its investment program (reduce the
government' s share of total resources) sufficientl y for purposes of compensa
tory finance.
A third alternative is for the government to continue its investment pro
gram, and to finance the 1-S gap .by competing with private borrowers in the
private sector market for funds. It would, in effect, bid away resources from
private users. This, plus appropriate ly restrictive monetary policy, would
offset the increases in demand generated by the government investment expendi
ture, It ~ould have the advantage of allowing money and capital markets to flour
ish and of interest rates to carry out their proper allocative functions.
One argument against.allo wing the level of interest rates to rise is
that it would palce a higher interest rate burden on the government. This is
a false argument, for a variety of reasons. Indeed, for any given amount of
liquidity in the private sector as determined by central bank policy, at the
margin government borrowing is at zero net cost to the government whether from
the private sector or from the Bank of Japan, whether at the high interest
rates or low. Theteason is that increased profits of the Bank of Japan from
increased interest receipts are transferred to the government. Any amount of
government borrowing from the private sector has to be matched by equivalent
Bank of Japan loans to the private sector, if the given level _of private
sector liquidity is to be maintained. I assume that the government borrow
rate from the private sector is at essentially the same level as the Bank of
Japan r.ediscount rate, so that what it pays out as interest it receives as
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If the governmen t were to borrow directly from the

Bank of Japan and thereby through its expenditu res generate excess private
demand, the Bank of Japan wouuld have to reduce its loans to the private sec
tor by an equivalen t amount.

This indeed is a fourth possibili ty. Fiscal policy under this circum
stance would continue to be expansive . The system would rely even more upon the
Bank of Japan than it has ~n the past fifteen years to reduce credit to the
private sector by ti~1t money measures sufficien tly to absorb the governme nt
generated excess demand. The Bank of Japan is unlikely to accomplis h such a
policy adequatel y, The result would be inflation .

Probably the laws re

stricting governmen t direct borrowing from the Bank of Japan will not be
chanced, in which case this really is not an alternati ve.
The governmen t would not be happy with a price decline substanti ally be
low par in its already issued bonds, and would be reluctant to see its interest
cost of funds much raised. The governmen t arguments appear to be founded on
bookkeepi ng, legalisti c, and status, pride, or otherpsyc hological criteria
rather than on economic reasoning . Thus, the final alternativ e is that the
governmen t will restore interest rate ceilings and other controls in order
to keep interest rates below equilibriu m levels. In other words, the govern

ment will revert to the control system used throughou t the postwar period.
Credit rationing and administr ative guidance would once again force private
financial institutio ns (and to some extent indirectl y the Bank of Japan) to.
finance the governme nt's borrowing at artificia lly low interest rates. For
reasons of prestige, the governmen t might well discontin ue financing the I-S
1. If the governmen t bond rate were below the central bank lending
rate the governmen t would actually make a small net profit.
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gap with governm ent bond issues , but instead issue local governm
ent and· public
~orpor ation bond's and, by shiftin g flows through governm ent finaric
ial.int er
mediar ies to finance governm ent investm ent, divert pas tal savings
.and life
in.suran ce more into governm ent investm ent. While this too will sop
up private
funds, relianc e will also have to'be placed upon. Bank of Japan restric
tive
credit polici es. If this alterna tive were selecte d, the nascen t
capita l market
would once again ,..tither away, and the efficac y of interes t rates
in the alloca 
tion process would be reduce d.
Which among, these alterna tives will the governm ent choose when
the success
of presen t fiscal policy restore s growth, and market -determ ined
intere st
rates rise?

My predic tion is_ that wqile the governm ent will make margin al

adjustm ents among the first four alterna tives to reduce the aggreg
ate demand
pressu re, its main adjustm ent will be to restore admini strativ e
contro ls over
financ ial market s and ceiling s on intere st rates. The attemp t to
establi sh
a real long-te rm capita l market and a market -determ ined structu
re of intere st
rates will be aborte d. Perhap s the most interes ting questio n is
how high -7 per cent?, 7-1/2 per cent? -- will the governm ent allow the market
yield
on governm ent bonds to rise before it clamps on contro ls once again.

